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In briefly reviewing Dean James Patker Hall's "Cases on Constitutional
Law" it is proper to say a word concerning the series of which this work
forms a part. Under the general editorship of James Rfro:n Scott, a series
of case books is being prepared, by men thoroughly competent to prepare
them, "with special reference to the needs of the class-rqom. on the funda-

mental subjects of legal education, which, through a judicious rearrangement
of emphasis, shall provide adequate training combined with a thorough knowledge of the general principles of the subject."
Instructors everywhere in the United States will welcome the advent of
these case books. Arid if others of the series approach the ideal above set
forth as nearly as Dean Hall's "Cases on Constitutional Law," the editor may
be congratulated on securing the substantial fulfillment of his purpose. Most
of the existing case books are too bulky for class use; and their plan seems
to be to cover the greater and smaller points and principles without discrimination or omission and without logical arrangement. They cover the
subject; but without judicious selection or enlightening classification. And
they are therefore not adapted to the needs of the law schools, where economy
of time and intelligently directed research are of the essence of the matter.
Dean Hall divided his book into three principal parts, "Making and
Changing Constitutions," "Fundamental Rights," and "The Federal Government." The first cases referred to direct the attention of the student to tile
essentials of constitution-making and the manner in whilkh constitutions can
be changed. Then follow cases on the power "Ofthe Couts to declare statutes
unconstitutional and on the effect of declared unconstitutionality. And lastly
under the first division are cases on the separation of powers and the delegation of powers.
This arrangement bf this first division of the b6ok is certainly well
adapted to meet the questions which are arising in daily discussion at the
present time, and the cited cases will answer, at the beginning of constitutional study, many of the questions with which the student has been confronted in the newspapers and in current popular discussion.
In the second division of his work under "Political Rights" the author
gives only bare citations as to "Republican Form of Government," "Freedom
of Speech and Press," "Right of Assemblage and Petition" and "Right to
Keep and Bear Arms," but the cases cited are cases which give full description
of such rights and their extent. "Citizenship" and "Suffrage" are fully dealt
with by selection from controlling cases. The outline given is ample for
class-room use, and the condensation resulting is desirable.
The work follo,,s the usual lines of arrangement in the headings relating
to "Personal and Religious Liberty," "Protection to Persons Accused of
Crime," "Due Process," "Equal Protection of Law" and "Eminent Domain."
The chapters on "Interstate Privilege and Immunities of Citizens" and
"Operation of Fourteenth Amendment in Securing Civil Rights," palticularly
the last chapter under the heading "Application to Corporations," present
an arrangement and selection peculiarly useful to the student.
In the last division of the work a notably good choice is made in the
entitling and compilation of the first chapter, relating to the "General Scope
of Federal Powers." The common instruction- in constitutional law has not
heretofore placed sufficient emphasis upon this phase of the subject Under
the arrangement of cases here made the limits of state and federal powers
are laid out as clearly as the subject permits. And this is continued in the
admirable chapter on "Regulation of Commerce" which brings that subject as
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nearly down to date as it could be brought at the time of publication. The
last chapter is well adapted for the short separate study of the Federal Courts,
as the author suggests in his preface.
It is true, in a sense, that case books are merely compilations. But there
are compilations and compilations. The ultimate law upon a given subject is
the result of the best cases. To know these cases, and knowing them, to
select from their voluminous contents the essential holding, and to present
it in a form adapted to the study of the principle sought to be illustrated.this is the work of the great mind and the great teacher. An illustration of
the method of the author in this respect is his treatment of the case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1 (1824). from which be chooses two extracts
in the text and one in the notes. In each case the quotation is sufficient
for the illustration of the principle, and there stops.
The combination of this precise and discriminating citation and.quotation with really illuminating titles and arrangement is the feature of the
work. It must also be said to be peculiarly adapted to the study of the
Federal Constitution in the light of present-day questions and criticism. As
the first of the series it has fully realized the anticipations of the general
editor. It typifies the "judicious rearrangement of emphasis" which he has
Louis L. Waters.
sought.
Syracuse, New York.
Baron Raffaele Garofalo. Procurator General at the Court of
Appeals of Venice. Translated from the Italian by Robert Wyness Millar,
Lecturer in Northwestern University Law School. With an Introduction
by E. Ray Stevens, Judge of the Circuit Court, Madison, Wis. No. 9 of
the Modern Criminal Science Series. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1x4.
Discarding the legal definition of crime as useless, Baron Garofalo finds
the scientific or sociologic definition of natural crime to be an act violating
either the sentiment of pity or the sentiment of probity, by the latter of which
he means a proper respect for all that which belongs to others. For the
precise definition of these sentiments he would not go to ethics but to the
current acceptation of them in the particular country at a particular time.
lie rejects the anthropologic theories of criminality as of no value; on the
other hand, he finds the root of crime in moral, not physical, anomaly. A
criminal is a moral monster. No morally well organized man can possibly
commit a natural crime solely by the force of external circumstances; the
casual offender is non-existent. Consistently he contends that our social and
economic order is not a cause of criminality. In every true criminal the
moral organism is defective; such defect is primary; its roots lie in heredity
or in atavism. This criminal anomaly is incapable of correction; there can
be no reformation of one guilty of a natural crime. The anomaly in the
particular individual, it is true, may be slight and will reveal itself only under
particular cir-umstances; but it is the anomaly, and not the circumstances,
that is the cause of the criminal act.
Since criminal anomaly is incapable of correction, the author would have
the penal arm of the state eliminate from society all whose anomaly is a
In the case of true murderers, by which he apparently
- menace to society.
means all who are guilty of first degree murder under our law, elimination
should take the form of execution; for their execution is demanded by the
social reaction against the crime and does not therefore violate the social
conscience. In all other crimes, save the least dangerous of the crimes mala
in se, aind in all cases of recividism. elimination should take the form of
deportation for life to a penal colony preferably upon some island of the
sea. For minor offenses mnala in se and for all offenses merely inala prohibita, the author would impose reparation both to the individual and to the
state. Consequently our present great penal establishment of prisons and
penitentiaries would have no place in this scheme of repression.
CRiumoIoGY.
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The author further would make radical changes in our criminal pro-

redure which he says often tends to protect th. criminal from society rather
than society from the criminal. He would wipe out trial by jury in all
but English-speaking coantries. He would aim to discover in the light of
the criminal's past what society has to apprehend from him in the future;
and, that determined, would decide whether or not elimination from society
was required.
There is indeed much valuable suggestion and discussion in this work.
The American student may not be willing to accept the author's theories
of the irredeemable nature of criminal; penalogolical development in this
country has been upon widely different theories. But we are unable to
a!-sert that our penalogy has been a success in practice; it may be that our
.,iasic principles, or lack of basic principles, is at fault. Of one thing we
"',
,,e'an
be certain; Garofalo's scheme of repression would result in a great reduc1
tion of persons who would be withdrawn from society. Elimination would
be far less frequent than incarceration in our present penitentiaries. Any
one who would seek to improve our present unscientific treatment of crime
will find much assistance in Baron Garofalo's work.

P. N. S.
By Everett V. Abbott. Houghton Mifflin
Company: Boston and New York, 1913.
Mr. Abbott believes there is a standard of absolute justice to which the
human race has struggled to approximate its laws and social customs, and
points to the common law as a development in which judgments have been
made and accepted under the influence of that instinct of the race rather
than by the force of bare precedent or sovereign authority. The principles
of law, therefore, he contends, coincide with the fundamental principles
of ethics, which lie dissects into three: a right in each individual to enjoy
freedom, a duty upon all individuals to help each other, and an obligation
to fulfil all promises voluntarily made. All jurisprudence can be reduced
to these prime factors, and Mr. Abbott demonstrates by applying them to
some doctrines of the c6mmon law which might seem to defy classification.
With this introduction the author plunges into a jeremiad, delivered with all
the vehemence of the Hebrew prophet, against the slipshod spirit of the
age, which has contaminated the springs of justice by letting turbid thinking and loose reasoning trickle through the minds of judges and lawyers
alike. In a review of some important recent decisions in the Supreme Court
of the United States and in the New York Court of Appeals he shows how
easily counsel are led astray by fallacies in their logic, and how often courts
are apt to shirk the burden of clear thinking by announcing their decisions
on the broad ground of a supposed "public policy." We must get back
to fundamentals, he concludes, and re-establish the principle of sufficient
reason for every legal conclusion we formulate and every decision we
announce. If all our lawyers were to clear their minds of cobwebs and commit themselves resolutely to a course of correct thinkinig, the writer
prophesies that there would be a new era in the administration of justice
which would take the nation by surprise and cure it of its latter-day hankering after'political nostrums. Mr. Abbott's method of attack is lively enough
to escape the imputation of platitude, and his illustrations are sufficiently concrete to make firm an argument that might easily evaporate in generalities.
It is too much to hope that it will cause us all to mend the error of our
ways, but the book is an optimistic effort in the direction of progress which
comes as a refreshing change at a time when the air is full of mere wind
and ink.
S. ..
JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAw.

